The United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, meeting in the Thomas F. Eagleton United States Courthouse in St. Louis, Missouri, handed down its ruling Monday regarding the Blytheville school choice lawsuit. The Court ruled, in a 2-1 split decision, that the earlier ruling made by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas is affirmed. The court sided with the Blytheville School District though not all questions were answered.
The case was not heard by the entire 15-member court, but rather the decision was rendered by a three justice panel comprised by Senior Circuit Judge Kermit Edward Bye, Senior Circuit Judge Clarence Arlen Beam and Circuit Judge Lavenski R. Smith. Justice Beam, however, issued the court's sole dissent. Beam dissented only on portions of the ruling, but concurred on the remainder.
"The split decision does not answer the key question of whether the Blytheville School District is subject to a desegregation case that ended in 1978. We believe the case raises issues of exceptional importance to families and children of Blytheville and across the state. Our clients are considering all their options including requesting a rehearing by the full court," said Jess Askew, III of Kutak Rock Law Firm in Little Rock and counsel for the plaintiffs.
Blytheville's attorney had a different reaction to the ruling.
"We're pleased that the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of Judge Baker," Blytheville School District Attorney Bobby Coleman of Reid, Burge, Prevallet and Coleman said.
Beam's dissent primarily dealt with constitutional claims in the areas of both "due process" and "property interests." The court's 38-page opinion is available here http://www.blythevillecourier.com/publication/2015-school-choice-ruling/2368
"I disagree, however, with the court's conclusions that the appellant have failed to prove these constitutional violations. To the contrary, the appellants successfully established both procedural due process and equal protection claims. Accordingly, I would remand the case to the district court to determine all necessary legal and factual issues concerning liability and monetary damages," Senior Circuit Judge Beam, appointed to the court in 1987 by President Ronald Reagan, wrote in the opinion's conclusion.
Beam added that the appellants [did] "succeed on their procedural due process claim, as the 2013 Act clearly created a protected tangible property interest in public school choice and attendance in Arkansas."
He also wrote, "The court attempts to use the statute's exemption clause to improperly slice and dice the relevant property interests created by Goss and the 2013 Act, using inapposite district court precedent to support its incorrect conclusion."
Beam also added that the "Blytheville School District wrongly and unconstitutionally exempted itself from the 2013 Act, the Blytheville District unlawfully deprived appellants of their protected property interest and hearing rights. The appellants clearly establish that the Blytheville District did not afford them adequate and statutorily specified procedural rights designed to protect their constitutionally protected property interest, and thus the Blytheville District violated the appellants' due process rights, see Ante at 15, for which violations the appellants are entitled to monetary damages".
Beam also disagreed "with the court's analysis of appellants' demand for damages under their equal protection claims. Despite the court's finding to the contrary, see id. at 26-27, nothing in the record in this case generated "at least a rational basis for [Blytheville District's] believing that the 2013 Act authorized it to take the exemption." Id. at 28. Indeed, the record clearly prevented the Blytheville District from nullifying appellants' attempted transfers to the nonresident district. No reasonable reading of Franklin v. Board of Education of the Blytheville, Arkansas, School District No.5, No. J-71-C-35 (E.D. Ark.), allowed the Blytheville District to believe it was still subject to a desegregation order of any nature."
Beam also stated "On June 21, 1973, Judge Eisele, noted that the items reserved as mentioned above 'are no longer a subject of controversy' and closed the case, reserving jurisdiction 'for necessary and appropriate purposes.' Five years later, on December 6, 1978, Judge Eisele issued an order fully dismissing the Franklin case. Thus, the plain language of these orders leaves no doubt that the Franklin court closed the case and ultimately ceded jurisdiction over the case and the parties. Therefore, as earlier noted, the Blytheville District had no rational basis for believing it was still subject to a desegregation order, and consequently no means of lawfully exempting itself from the 2013 Act. The Blytheville District's violation of the 2013 Act and the subsequent disparate treatment that resulted-allowing intra-district transfers to the Kipp Delta charter school, but denying appellants' inter-district transfers under the 2013 Act-violated appellants' equal protection rights, for which appellants are entitled to monetary damages."
Beam also stated, "the district court's incorrect holding that Judge Eisele, in Franklin, should have made a specific finding that the Blytheville District had achieved unitary status in order to properly dismiss the August 1971 desegregation action is based on inapposite cases and faulty analysis of applicable law. Indeed, at the time the Franklin court dismissed the action in 1978, there was no case law requiring a finding of unitary status in order to properly close a desegregation order".
"Penultimately, with regard to the Blytheville District's transfer exemption claim, I note that the Board of Directors of the Blytheville District do not and cannot deny that they, and their predecessor Boards, have actually operated a desegregated unitary public school system since at least 1978. There also appears to be no evidence in this case, or even any claims, that a dual, segregated public school system or any vestiges of the same has in any way operated since Judge Eisele's final order in 1978. Accordingly, the Blytheville District's exemption claims were, in substance, wholly specious. Finally, in the alternative, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Blytheville District. Summary judgment is only proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact....the granting of summary judgment to the Blytheville District was erroneous. For the aforementioned reasons, I respectfully dissent on the issue of the appellants' damages arising from their procedural due process and equal protection claims and would remand the issues back to the district court to determine monetary damages, costs and fees," Beam concluded.
In essence, the three judge panel voted to affirm the earlier decision which supported the Blytheville School Board's actions and no monetary awards have been ordered either. The decision is rendered final unless the appellants decide to either request a rehearing by the full Eighth District Court of Appeals or if they decide to appeal this ruling to the United States Supreme Court through a Petition of Certiorari.
thenry@blythevillecourier.com